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Abstract
We price vulnerable derivatives - i.e. derivatives where the counter-
party may default. These are basically the derivatives traded on the OTC
markets. Default is modeled in a structural framework. The technique
employed for pricing is Good Deal Bounds. The method imposes a new
restriction in the arbitrage free model by setting upper bounds on the
Sharpe ratios of the assets. The potential prices which are eliminated
represent unreasonably good deals. The constraint on the Sharpe ratio
translates into a constraint on the stochastic discount factor. Thus, tight
pricing bounds can be obtained. We provide a link between the objec-
tive probability measure and the range of potential risk neutral measures
which has an intuitive economic meaning. We also provide tight pricing
bounds for European calls and show how to extend the call formula to
pricing other financial products in a consistent way. Finally, we numeri-
cally analyze the behavior of the good deal pricing bounds.
Key words: Incomplete markets, Good deal bounds, Vulnerable options.
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1 Introduction
Vulnerable derivatives are derivatives that bear counterparty risk – in other
words, the writer of the option may not deliver the underlying. The main
reason for having counterparty risk is the fact that these options are traded
over-the-counter (OTC). If traded on an organized exchange, the counterparty
risk associated with the option disappears due to the presence of the market
maker. Our main application is the pricing of equity linked derivatives, mainly
options, since they represent a major class of derivatives where one party bears
the counterparty risk and there are many possible variations of the option payoff.
According to BIS, the OTC equity-linked option gross market value in the first
half of 2010 is USD 22.18 bln1. Moreover, there has been an increase in the
volume of equity linked derivatives in the last few years. Thus, it is necessary
to have consistent pricing of vulnerable options.
In the previous literature, vulnerable options were priced using structural
models for default, i.e. a model for credit risk that takes into account the
value of the assets of the option writer (counterparty) in order to define default.
The main ingredients for such a framework are the dynamics of the stock and
the dynamics of the assets of the counterparty. The papers were assuming
market completeness - i.e that both the underlying stock and the assets of the
counterparty are traded assets. Such papers include Johnson and Stulz (1987),
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Hull and White (1995) and Klein (1996).
One of the main limitations of the above mentioned framework is the as-
sumption that the assets of the counterparty, or the default “trigger”, are liq-
uidly traded on the market. It is a strong assumption, which allows us to obtain
a unique price for the vulnerable option. If both the stock and the assets of the
counterparty are traded on the market, we have a complete market model and,
1Statistics available through the Bank for International Settlements, at
http://bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm
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hence, a unique price.
However, if the assets of the counterparty are not liquidly traded, we are
not in a complete market setup and hence, we are not entitled to use the for-
mula derived in the previous section. One of the consequences of having an
incomplete market setup is the fact that we no longer have a unique equivalent
martingale measure (EMM) and consequently, we do not a unique price. One
could simply calculate the bounds of the prices generated by the interval of all
possible risk-neutral measures. These bounds are known as the no-arbitrage
bounds. However, they are too large to be of any practical use.
Another alternative would be to pick one of the possible equivalent martin-
gale measures, according to some criterion chosen by the researcher/implementer
of the model. The literature adopting this path is vast. For further reference to
different strands of literature dealing with this approach see Schweizer (2001),
Henderson and Hobson (2008) and Barrieu and Karoui (2005). However, there
is no clear-cut way of choosing between different criteria and some of them
are somewhat ad-hoc, in the sense that they do not have any clear economic
interpretation.
In contrast to this, Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) proposed the method
of good deal bounds. The good deal approach aims at obtaining an interval of
“reasonable” prices in incomplete markets, rather than concentrating on ob-
taining a unique price. Since the no-arbitrage bounds are too large to be used,
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) propose to not only rule out arbitrage oppor-
tunities, but also trade opportunities which are too favorable to be observed on
a real market. These unrealistically-favorable deals are considered “too good to
be true”, hence the name of “good deal bounds”. One possible measure for the
“goodness” of a deal is its Sharpe Ratio and thus, trades/portfolios which have
a Sharpe Ratio (SR) above a certain threshold are eliminated. The SR is chosen
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as a measure for the “goodness of the deal” because of its intuitive meaning, but
also due to a large empirical literature which can tell us the range of the Sharpe
Ratios observed on the market. Thus, the bound on the SR will not be arbitrary.
The procedure reduces the set of possible prices for the claims traded. Thus,
the good-deal bounds methodology leads to a much tighter interval of possible
prices than the bounds obtained by no-arbitrage.
The next step in developing a theory for “good deal bounds” was taken
by Bjo¨rk and Slinko (2006). They proposed a new framework for solving the
optimization problem defined by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) while at the
same time allowing for more complex dynamics for the underlying assets, such
as jump-diffusion processes, to be taken into account.
The first to notice the complete market inconsistency in the case of vul-
nerable options were Hung and Liu (2005). They priced the vulnerable options
using the structural model set up by Klein (1996) and using “good deal bounds”
as defined by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000).
In contrast, we use the good deal bounds framework proposed by Bjo¨rk
and Slinko (2006) which allows for a higher degree of tractability and hence, we
can deal with the more general problem of pricing a derivative claim on equity,
rather than just options. Besides pricing European vulnerable options as an
application of the good deal bounds with counterparty risk, we also show how
results obtained for complete markets, non-vulnerable options pricing, can be
extended in the incomplete market case, for the pricing of vulnerable options.
Thus, we show how the same techniques can be used to infer the pricing bounds
for the exchange options and the barrier options from the pricing bounds of the
European calls. Then, we presents a few numerical results and conclude.
4
2 Setup
In this paper, we model default in the classical Merton framework, while drop-
ping the assumption of market completeness.
Let (Ω,F , P,F) be a filtered probability space. On this space, we have W˜ ,
a two-dimensional P-Wiener process:
W˜ =
(
W˜ 1
W˜ 2
)
,
with W˜ 1 and W˜ 2 being independent scalar P-Wiener processes. The filtration
Ft is is generated by W˜ . Our market has a risk free asset, the bank account,
denoted by Bt, and a liquidly traded risky asset, St. The derivative claims
contracted are over the counter and written on St. Our counterparty’s assets Yt
are not traded, but we know their dynamics. The dynamics of the traded and
non-traded assets under the objective probability measure P are:
dYt = µtYtdt+ Ytσ¯tdW˜t, (1)
dSt = αtStdt+ Stγ¯tdW˜t, (2)
dBt = Btrdt. (3)
The parameter r represents the constant risk-free interest rate. The coefficients
µt and αt are scalar deterministic functions of time and σ¯t and γ¯t are positive
deterministic functions of time specified as follows:
γ¯t = ( γt, 0 ) ,
σ¯t = (σtρ, σt
√
1− ρ2 ) .
Remark 2.1 One can extend the dynamics of the stock and the assets of the
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counterparty to a jump-diffusion setup. However, in that case we would have a
market with one traded asset and four sources of risk. Hence, it would be difficult
to know if the size of the good deal bounds interval is driven by the presence of
the counterparty risk or by the presence of jumps in the traded asset.
On the OTC market, we are trading a European derivative X with the
payoff Φ(ST ). If there were no counterparty risk, its price at time t would
be the conditional expected value of the discounted payoff Φ(ST ), where the
expectation is taken under the risk-neutral measure. With counterparty risk,
we need to specify how default occurs and the value recovered in case of default.
In our case, default occurs if the value of the assets of the counterparty at T
falls below the claims written against the counterparty, denoted by D. If default
occurs, the payoff of claim X becomes R, the recovery payoff which is given by:
R = (1− β)YT
D
Φ(ST ).
The logic behind the above formula is straightforward. One gets a pro-
portional part of the value of the claim, corresponding to how much the assets
of the counter-party have fallen below the value of the claim. However, there
are some deadweight costs associated with the bankruptcy procedure, which are
captured by the β parameter. For these reasons, β needs to belong to [0, 1].This
recovery specification is very close to the specification for recovery of treasury.
Thus, we can write the payoff of a vulnerable claim as:
ΦV (ST , YT ) = Φ(ST )I {YT ≥ D}+RI {YT < D} , (4)
where D is the total value of the claims against the counter-party. We notice
that, in general, the vulnerable version of a contract function Φ(x), denoted by
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ΦV (x, y) is given by:
ΦV (x, y) = Φ(x)
{
I {y ≥ D}+ (1− β)y
D
I {y < D}
}
. (5)
We denote
G(y) = I {y ≥ D}+ (1− β)y
D
I {y < D} (6)
2.1 The Equivalent Martingale Measures
Since we are in an incomplete market set-up, we do not have a unique equivalent
martingale measure (EMM), but a whole class of EMM. For any potential EMM
Q ∼ P we define the corresponding likelihood process L by:
Lt =
dQ
dP
on Ft. (7)
Since Ft = FW˜t , Lt must have dynamics of the form:
dLt = Ltϕ
′
tdW˜t, (8)
L0 = 1, (9)
where ϕt = (ϕ
1
t , ϕ
2
t )
′
is adapted to F. Thus, the dynamics of the two assets
under the potential martingale measure Q are:
dYt = (µt + σ¯tϕt)Ytdt+ Ytσ¯tdWt,
dSt = (αt + γ¯tϕt)Stdt+ Stγ¯tdWt,
dBt = Btrdt,
7
where Wt is a Q-Wiener process. Since St is a traded asset, its drift must equal
the risk-free interest rate under an equivalent martingale measure. Thus, for Q
to be a martingale measure, ϕ has to satisfy the martingale condition:
r = αt + γ¯tϕt (10)
The martingale condition does not determine a unique Girsanov kernel ϕt, but
only the first term of the ϕt. Thus, we do not have a unique equivalent martin-
gale measure, but we obtain a class of martingale measures. They are defined
as the class of measures obtained by (7)- (9) and satisfying the martingale con-
dition (10).
3 The good deal bound problem
As previously mentioned, the “good deal bound” valuation framework rests on
the idea of placing constraints on the Sharpe ratio of the claim to be priced. The
problem becomes that of finding the highest and the lowest arbitrage free price
processes, subject to a constraint on the maximum Sharpe Ratio (SR). However,
if we want to be consistent, we should look for a framework allowing us to
place an upper bound on the SR not only of the derivative under consideration,
but also of all portfolios that can be formed on the market consisting of the
underlying assets, the derivative claim and the money account. It then turns
out that binding the Sharpe Ratio of all possible portfolios is equivalent to using
the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.
An extended version of the Hansen Jaganathan bounds is derived and proven
in Bjo¨rk and Slinko (2006). This inequality provides the bounds for the Sharpe
ratio of the assets on the market, as well as for all derivatives and self financing
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portfolios formed on the market, and reads as follows:
|SRt|2 ≤ ‖λt‖2.
Here we denote by λt the market price of risk and by SRt the Sharpe ratio on a
particular asset derivative or self financing portfolio on the market; ‖ • ‖ stands
for the Euclidean norm.
As we can see, the Sharpe ratio is bounded by the norm of the price of risk on
the market. Standard theory gives us the relationship between the Girsanov
kernel, ϕt, and the market price of risk:
ϕt = −λt.
Thus, our pricing problem can be reformulated as follows: we are trying to find
the highest and the lowest arbitrage free pricing processes, subject to an upper
bound on the norm of the market price for risk or, equivalently, a bound on the
Girsanov kernel ϕt for every t. Dealing with the market price of risk translates
into dealing with the Girsanov kernel of the equivalent martingale measures.
Following the above reasoning, we can now define the good deal bounds. In
the definition below and the rest of the paper, for a random variable Y , the
notation EQt [Y ] stands for the conditional expected value of Y , taken at time t
and under the risk measure Q.
Definition 3.1 The upper good deal bound price process for a vulnerable
option is defined as the optimal value process for the following optimal control
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problem:
max
ϕ
EQt [e
−r(T−t)(Φ(ST )I {YT ≥ D}+RI {YT ≤ D})],
dYt = (µt + σ¯tϕt)Ytdt+ Ytσ¯tdWt,
dSt = rStdt+ Stγ¯tdWt, (11)
αt + γ¯tϕt = r, (12)
‖ϕt‖2 ≤ C2. (13)
The lower good deal bound process is the optimal value process for a similar
optimal control problem, with the only difference that we minimize the expres-
sion, subject to the same constraints.
We denote the optimal value process by V (t, St, Yt), where V is the optimal
value function.
Before proceeding, let us comment on the structure of the optimization prob-
lem. The objective function is the arbitrage-free price for the payoff function,
where the expectation is computed under the risk neutral measure generated
by ϕ. Since we must select this measure from a continuum of eligible EMM, we
maximize with respect to the Girsanov kernel ϕ.
The optimization is subject to the dynamics of the assets on the market,
under the appropriate probability measure.
The constraints (11)-(12) are the usual constraints on the drift of the traded
assets on the market that establish the probability measure as a risk neutral
measure.
If all elements of ϕ could be identified from these constraints, we would be
in a complete market setup and would be able to find a unique price. Since the
number of traded assets is smaller than the number of risk sources, we cannot
price all risk factors and need the last inequality in order to tighten the no
10
arbitrage price bounds. We will refer to the inequality (13) as the good deal
bounds condition.
4 Solving the HJB
The optimization problem stated above is a standard stochastic optimal control
problem and it will be solved with the aid of the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equa-
tion. We restrict ourselves to the case when the market price of risk depends only
on the stock and the assets of the counterparty; thus, we have ϕt = ϕ(t, St, Yt).
According to the general theory of dynamic programing, the optimal value func-
tion satisfies the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation, where A denotes the in-
finitesimal operator for (S, Y ):
∂V
∂t
(t, s, y) + sup
ϕ
AV (t, s, y)− rV (t, s, y) = 0,
V (T, s, y) = ΦV (s, y),
where ΦV (s, y) is defined by (4). The infinitesimal operator is given by:
AV = ∂V
∂s
rs+
∂V
∂y
(µt + σ¯tϕt)y
+
1
2
∂2V
∂s2
s2γ¯tγ¯
′
t +
1
2
∂2V
∂y2
y2σ¯tσ¯
′
t +
∂2V
∂s∂y
syγ¯tσ¯
′
t.
The first step in solving the PDE is to solve the embedded static maximization
problem for each t, s, y. In our case, for fixed t, s, y, the static problem takes
the form:
max
ϕ
∂V
∂y
σϕy, (14)
α+ γ¯ϕ = r, (15)
‖ϕ‖2 ≤ C2. (16)
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We notice that the above problem is, in fact, a linear optimization problem and
therefore, the solution will be a boundary solution. Thus, both constraints are
binding. Since the Girsanov kernel ϕ is a (2,1) matrix, by solving the system of
equations:
α+ γ¯ϕ = r,
‖ϕ‖2 = C2,
we obtain:
ϕˆ(t, s, y)′ = (−αt−rγt , ±
√
C2 − ( r−αtγt )2 ) . (17)
Thus, we have two candidates for the optimal ϕ and it remains to be determined
which is the optimal one. Since our objective function is linear in ϕ:
∂V
∂y
σϕy,
and σ and y are positive by assumption, we need to investigate the sign of ∂V∂y
to decide which of the possible Girsanov kernels we choose.
Lemma 4.1 Let the good deal bound price process be defined as in Definition
3.1. If ϕ does not depend on s and y, we have
∂V
∂y
≥ 0. (18)
Proof. First, we will show that the payoff function is non-decreasing in y.
Then, we will prove that this implies that the associated pricing function is
non-decreasing in y and hence, so is the optimal value function.
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One can easily see that the payoff function ΦV (s, y) is non-decreasing in y
if we go back to equation (5). If y ≥ D, we have
ΦV (x, y) = Φ(x)
and if y < D, ΦV (s, y) is linear in y with a positive coefficient, from the as-
sumptions on β and D and the definition of Φ(x).
Let ΠQ(t, s, y) be a pricing function, i.e.
ΠQ(t, s, y) = EQ[e−r(T−t)ΦV [ST , YT ]|St = s, Yt = y], (19)
where Q is some admissible EMM.
We now want to prove that if the payoff function ΦV (s, y) is increasing in
y and the Girsanov kernel is a deterministic function of time
ϕ(t, s, y) = ϕ(t),
also the pricing function ΠQ(t, s, y) is increasing in the variable y. We solve the
SDE giving the dynamics of Yt under Q and obtain the following formula for
YT , given Yt = y:
YT = y exp
(∫ T
t
[
µs + σ¯sϕs − 1
2
σ2s
]
ds+
∫ T
t
σ¯sdWs
)
.
Thus, for a given ϕ which does not depend on s and y, we can write YT = yZ,
where Z is a lognormal variable that does not depend on y. It can easily be
seen that if Φ(s, y) is increasing in the second variable, then also the pricing
function ΠQ(t, s, y) is increasing in the variable y.
We know that V = ΠQ when Q is generated by ϕˆ. Since we see from (17)
that ϕˆ does not depend on s and y, we conclude that ΠQ(t, s, y) and thus V is
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nondecreasing in y.
Proposition 4.1 The Girsanov kernel corresponding to the upper good deal
bound EMM is
ϕˆ′max = (−αt−rγt ,
√
C2 − ( r−αtγt )2 ) ,
The Girsanov kernel for the lower good deal bound EMM is given by
ϕˆ′min = (−αt−rγt , −
√
C2 − ( r−αtγt )2 ) ,
5 Extending the formula
5.1 Linearly homogeneous payoffs and exchange options
In this section, we consider derivatives written on several assets with linearly
homogeneous payoffs - i.e. derivatives whose non-vulnerable payoffs Φ(s1, s2)
have the property:
Φ(λs1, λs2) = λΦ(s1, s2), ∀λ ≥ 0.
The most common example of a claim with a linearly homogeneous payoff would
be the exchange option with the payoff X = max[S1T−S2T , 0].A well-known result
in mathematical finance relates the non-vulnerable pricing problem of Φ to the
simpler problem of pricing ψ, defined by the contract function:
ψ(z) = Φ(z, 1). (20)
We would like to see if it is possible to find such a relation between vulnerable
versions of the contracts defined above, as well as what the simplified pricing
problem would look like for good deal bounds.
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Let us consider a market formed by a risk free asset, the bank account,
denoted by Bt, and two liquidly traded risky asset, S
1
t and S
2
t . The derivative
claims contracted are over the counter and written on both assets. As pre-
viously, the assets of our counterparty Yt are not traded, but we know their
dynamics. The dynamics of the traded and non-traded assets under the objec-
tive probability measure P are:
dYt = µtYtdt+ Ytσ¯tdW˜t, (21)
dS1t = α
1
tS
1
t dt+ S
1
t γ¯
1
t dW˜t, (22)
dS2t = α
2
tS
2
t dt+ S
2
t γ¯
2
t dW˜t, (23)
dBt = Btrdt.
As previously, we denote the vulnerable version of the contract function
Φ(S1t , S
2
t ) by Φ
V (S1t , S
2
t , Yt) and the vulnerable version of the contract function
ψ(St) by ψ
V (St, Yt). We remember that, in general, the vulnerable version of a
contract function F (x), denoted by FV (x, y) is given by:
FV (x, y) = F (x)G(y),
with G(y) as given by equation (6). By applying the risk neutral valuation
formula to the claim Y with payoff ΦV (S1t , S2t , Yt), we obtain the following
expression for the price of the claim, Π(t,Y):
Π(t,Y) = EQt
[
e(−r(T−t))ΦV (S1T , S
2
T , YT )
]
= S2tE
2
t
[
Φ
(
S1T
S2T
, 1
)
G(YT )
]
,
where E2[•] is the expectation operator taken under the equivalent martingale
measure Q2 where S2 is the numeraire. We denote
S1t
S2t
by Zt. Under Q
2, Z is
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a martingale, and has a zero rate of return. We note that in order to obtain a
similar result as in the non-vulnerable claims case, we would need Yt to also be
a Q2-martingale. However, since we are not in a complete market set-up and Yt
is not a traded asset, we have to take a different route.
Should Yt be a traded asset, we could define it as Yt = Y˜te
ctt where ct =
r + γ¯2t σ¯
′
t. Notice that Y˜t is a martingale under Q
2. A few easy computations
show the price of the vulnerable claim Y at time t:
Π(t,Y) = S2tE2t
[
Φ(ZT , 1)I
{
Y˜T ≥ De−cT
}]
+ S2tE
2
[
(1− β)Y˜T
De−cT
Φ(ZT , 1)I
{
Y˜T < De
−cT
}]
= S2tE
2
[
ψ(ZT , Y˜T )
]
,
where the default barrier for the vulnerable claim Y = ψ(ZT , Y˜T ) is De−cT .
In our case, Yt is not a traded asset and we do not have a unique martingale
measure, so we can use good deal bounds to obtain tighter pricing bounds. We
remember that the good deal bounds are defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 The upper good deal bound price process for a vulnerable
exchange option is defined as the optimal value process for the following optimal
control problem:
max
ϕ
EQ[e−r(T−t)X ],
α1 + γ¯1ϕt = r,
α2 + γ¯2ϕt = r,
‖ϕt‖2 ≤ C2,
where Yt, S
1
t and S
2
t have dynamics as given by equation (21)-(23). The lower
good deal bound is the optimal value process for a similar optimal control
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problem, except that we minimize instead of maximize subject to the same con-
straints.
We will show how to obtain this equivalent good deal bounds problem which
allows a direct transfer from the pricing problem of a vulnerable claim with
linearly homogeneous payoff Φ(S1t , S
2
t ) to the pricing problem of a vulnerable
claim on only one asset, which is a more simple problem. We will do this by
obtaining equivalent expressions to the objective function and the constraints
under the new measure Q2 and involving a Girsanov kernel corresponding to
the change of measure P → Q2, denoted by ψ.
We will present how we have obtained the equivalent problem:
• We apply a standard change of measure to the objective function of the
upper good deal bound problem and obtain: EQ[e−rTX ] = S20E2[Z] where
Z = ψ(Zt)G(Yt)
and ZT =
S1T
S2
T
and G(Yt) is as defined in equation (5); E
2(•) denotes the
expectations operator under Q2.
We denote by φ the Girsanov kernel corresponding to the change of mea-
sure P → Q2.
• We can easily derive the dynamics of S1t
S2t
and Yt under Q
2 using the Gir-
sanov transformation and the fact that
S1t
S2t
should be a martingale under
the new measure.
dYt = (µ+ σ¯ψt)Ytdt+ Ytσ¯dW
2
t (24)
d
(
S1t
S2t
)
=
S1t
S2t
(γ¯1 − γ¯2)dW 2t (25)
where W 2t is Q
2-Wiener.
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• The next step is to derive the martingale conditions corresponding to
Q2. These are derived by setting
S1t
S2t
and Bt
S2t
as martingales under Q2, as
required by the definition of the new measure. We obtain:
r − α2 = γ¯2ψt − γ22 ,
α1 − α2 = γ1γ2ρ12 − γ22 − (γ¯1 − γ¯2)ψt,
• The next step in our equivalence problem is to take the good deal bound
condition for the transformation P → Q:
‖ϕt‖2 ≤ C2,
and find an equivalent good deal bound condition for the transformation
P → Q2. We define the following transformations:
– P → Q , defined by L = dQdP on FT with dL = Lϕ′dW˜ ;
– P → Q2 , defined by L2 = dQ2dP on FT with dL2 = L2φ′dW˜ ;
– Q→ Q2 , defined by L1,2 = dQ2dQ on FT with dL1,2 = L1,2γ¯2dW
We notice that
dQ2
dP
dQ
dP
=
dQ2
dQ
.
The above equation together with the dynamics of the three Radon-
Nikodym derivatives yield the following relation between ϕ and φ:
ϕ = φ− γ¯′2.
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Thus, the good deal bounds constraint becomes:
‖φ− γ¯′2‖2 ≤ C2.
Thus, we have reduced the problem of pricing a vulnerable claim written on two
assets to the problem of pricing a vulnerable claim written on one asset. We
can summarise the result as follows:
Proposition 5.1 The upper good deal bound price process defined in Definition
5.1 is also the optimal value process for the optimal control problem given below:
max
φ
S2tE
2[Z],
dYt = (µ+ 2σ¯φ− σ¯γ¯2)Ytdt+ Ytσ¯dW 2t ,
d
(
S1t
S2t
)
=
S1t
S2t
(γ¯1 − γ¯2)dW 2t ,
r − α2 = γ¯2ψt − γ22 ,
α1 − α2 = γ1γ2ρ12 − γ22 − (γ¯1 − γ¯2)ψt,
‖φ− γ¯′2‖2 ≤ C2.
The lower good deal bound is the optimal value process for a similar optimal
control problem, where we minimize subject to the same constraints as above.
By a reasoning very similar to that in the previous section, we calculate the
upper good deal bound Girsanov kernel.
6 Small numerical example - the vulnerable op-
tion
In this section, we will implement the good deal bounds and obtain the price of
a vulnerable option when the stock is liquidly traded. Thus, the payoff of our
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non-vulnerable claim is Φ(ST ) = max[ST − K, 0] where K is the strike price.
We need to compute the price for a vulnerable European call, hence our payoff
is:
ΦV (ST , YT ) = max[ST −K, 0]
{
I {YT ≥ D}+ (1− β)YT
D
I {YT < D}
}
.
The above payoff of a vulnerable option was first priced in complete markets by
Klein (1996). It was later priced in incomplete markets by Hung and Liu (2005)
using “good deal bounds” as defined by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000). We
note that using the good deal bounds as defined by Bjo¨rk and Slinko (2006),
the upper and the lower GDB price can be derived in a manner similar to that
of Klein (1996). The difference between the formulae is due to the fact that
the drift under the risk neutral measure of the assets of the counterparty Yt is
no longer given by the risk-free rate, as in the complete market case, but by
the Girsanov transformations corresponding to the Girsanov kernels identified
in proposition 4.1.
Proposition 6.1 (Vulnerable Options) The upper good deal bound price of
a vulnerable option is given by:
Π(t) = StN [a1, b1, ρ2]− e−r(T−t)KN [a2, b2, ρ2]
+
1− β
D
StYt exp
{∫ T
t
[µs + σ¯sϕˆs + σsγsρ] ds
}
N [−a3; b3;−ρ2]
− e−r(T−t)K(1− β)
D
Yt exp
{∫ T
t
(µs + σ¯sϕˆs)ds
}
N (a4, b4,−ρ2),
where
a1 =
ln StK +
∫ T
t
{
r + 12γ
2
s
}
ds√∫ T
t
γ2sds
,
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b1 =
ln YtD +
∫ T
t
[
µs + σ¯sϕˆs + σsγsρ− 12σ2s
]
ds√∫ T
t
σ2sds
,
a2 =
ln StK + r(T − t)− 12
∫ T
t
γ2sds√∫ T
t
γ2sds
,
b2 =
ln YtD +
∫ T
t
[
µs + σ¯sϕˆs − 12σ2s
]
ds√∫ T
t
σ2sds
,
a3 =
ln StK +
∫ T
t
{
r + 12γ
2
s + σsγsρ
}
ds√∫ T
t
γ2sds
,
b3 =
log DYt −
∫ T
t
{
µs + σ¯sϕˆs + γsσsρ+
1
2σ
2
s
}
ds√∫ T
t
‖σ¯s‖2ds
,
a4 =
ln StK +
∫ T
t
[
r + γsσsρ− 12γ2s
]
ds√∫ T
t
γ2sds
,
b4 =
ln DYt +
∫ T
t
[
µs + σ¯sϕˆs +
1
2σ
2
s
]
ds√∫ T
t
σ2sds
,
ρ2 =
ρ
∫ T
t
σsγsds√∫ T
t
σ2sds
√∫ T
t
γ2sds
,
ϕˆt = (−αt−rγt ,
√
C2 − ( r−αtγt )2 )
′
.
The lower good deal bound price is given by a similar pricing formula, with the
only exception that
ϕˆt = (−αt−rγt , −
√
C2 − ( r−αtγt )2 )
′
.
Proof. The results can be derived in a manner similar to that of Klein (1996)
and are therefore omitted. Detailed computations are presented in Murgoci
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The figure 1 plots the upper and lower GDB prices for a one-year European
call option with strike 100 and good deal bound constant C=1.5, against the
initial stock price. As would be expected, the size of the good deal bound price
interval depends heavily on the moneyness of the option. The parameters used
are the following: the risk free rater is 4%; the expected return and the volatility
of the stock are given by α = 0.1 and σ = 0.45; the assets of the counterparty
have a drift µ = 0.1 and volatility γ = 0.2; the assets of the counterparty and
the stock have an instant correlation equal to 0.3; the dead weight loss β is 0.3.
The value of the claims against the counterparty is given by D = 100. Since
the good deal bound price interval depends on the distance to default of the
counterparty, the upper graph presents results obtained when assuming that
initially, the assets of the counterparty are 104; hence, the counterparty is very
close to default. The lower graph assumes the assets of the counterparty to be
120, and the counterparty is far from default.
Besides the GDB prices, the figure also presents the prices obtained from
the Black-Scholes formula and the formula for a vulnerable option by Klein
(1996). We notice that although the upper good deal bound price and the
Black Scholes price are numerically different, the difference is so small that it
cannot be distinguished in the graph. Moreover, the complete market price is
always very close to the upper good deal bound price and the Black-Scholes
price. The figure supports the intuition that the discount due to counterparty
risk will be higher when the counterparty is close to default.
Remark 6.1 (Barrier Options) The formula for a vulnerable European call
to price vulnerable barrier options can be used in a manner similar to the non
vulnerable case derived in Bjo¨rk (2004). Let Ψ denote a claim on the traded
stock price. We denote by ΨLO the down and out version of the vulnerable
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Figure 1: Upper and Lower GDB prices for a European Call
The figure presents the upper and lower GDB prices plotted against the initial stock price
for a one-year European call option with strike 100 and good deal bound constant C=1.5.
The figure also presents the price obtained using the Black Scholes formula and the formula
for a vulnerable option obtained by Klein (1996). The upper graph presents results obtained
when assuming that initially, the assets of the counterparty are 104, compared to the claims
D = 100. The lower graph assumes the claims against the counterparty to still be 100 but
the assets of the counterparty are 120.
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claim - i.e. a claim which pays Ψ as long as the underlying of the claim is above
a certain level L and 0 otherwise. An easy example is the down and out option,
with the payoff:
ΨLO(ST ) =
 max[ST −K, 0], if St > L, for all t ≤ T0, otherwise
We denote by ΨVLO the vulnerable version of a down-and-out claim. Using the
same reasoning as in Bjo¨rk (2004), one can prove the formula:
Π(0,ΨVLO) = e
−rT
{
EQ0,s,y
[
ΨVL (ST , YT )
]− (L
s
) 2r˜
γ2
EQ
0,L
2
s ,y(
L
s )
2ρ
[
ΨVL (ST , YT )
]}
,
where r˜ = r − 12σ2 and EQ0,s,y[•] denotes the conditional expected value taken at
time t = 0, given that S0 = s and Y0 = y.
Since only the no-arbitrage assumption (the existence of a martingale measure)
and not the market completeness (the unicity of this measure) is used in the
proof, it must hold also in incomplete markets as long as we have picked a risk
neutral measure Q according to some criteria. Choosing the Girsanov kernels
as in proposition 4.1, we obtain the upper and the lower good deal bound prices
for the down-and-out barrier option.
7 Stability of the GDB prices
In this section, we investigate how sensitive is the good deal bounds formula to
the choice of the good deal bound constant C. As previously mentioned, this
constant is chosen by the implementer depending on his/her experience and
past market performance. The figure 2 presents results for the at-the-money
European call computed with the same parameters as in the previous question.
As before, we present results for both the case when the counterparty is close
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to default and when the counterparty is far from default. Since the upper GDB
price is already very close to the Black-Scholes price, it is not sensitive to the
choice of C. The lower GDB price proves to be sensitive to the choice of C,
losing four monetary units for an increase of one in the GDB constant. An
interesting note is the fact that the lower GDB price deterioration due to an
increase in C is similar for both cases. We also note that values in the Sharpe
ratio observed on the financial markets are significantly lower than 1.5, with the
Sharpe ratio of S&P 500 around 0.4.
8 Conclusion
We price vulnerable derivative claims - i.e. options where the counterparty may
default. These are basically options traded on the OTC markets. Default is
modeled in a structural framework.
We price the claims in the more realistic, incomplete market pricing prob-
lem. The technique employed for pricing is Good Deal Bounds. The method
imposes a new restriction in the arbitrage free model by setting upper bounds
on the Sharpe ratios of the assets. The potential prices which are eliminated
represent unreasonably good deals, as defined by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo
(2000) and Bjo¨rk and Slinko (2006). The constraint on the Sharpe ratio trans-
lates into a constraint on the stochastic discount factor. Thus, tighter pricing
bounds can be obtained. We provide a link between the objective probability
measure and the range of potential risk neutral measures which has an intuitive
economic meaning. We also provide tighter pricing bounds for European calls
and show how to extend the call formula to pricing other financial products in a
consistent way. Specific examples for exchange options and barrier options are
computed.
Finally, we analyze numerically the behavior of the good deal pricing bounds
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Figure 2: The upper and lower GDB prices when we vary the GDB constraint
The figure presents the upper and lower GDB prices for at-the-money one-year European call
option with strike 100. The good deal bound constant C varies between 1.5 and 3. The
figure also presents the price obtained using the Black Scholes formula and the formula for
a vulnerable option obtained by Klein (1996). The upper graph presents results obtained
when assuming that initially, the assets of the counterparty are 104, compared to the claims
D = 100. The lower graph assumes the claims against the counterparty to still be 100 but
the assets of the counterparty are 120.
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interval and analyze what impact the good-deal bound constraint has on the
size of the good deal price interval. We show that the lower good deal bound
is sensitive to the choice of GDB constant. However, the values for which we
have applied the good deal bounds are extremely conservative and significantly
higher than what is usually observed on the market. In order to obtain tighter
bounds, it is important to have good econometric studies regarding the Sharpe
Ratio of the investment opportunities existing on the market. The good deal
bounds are model dependent and it would be interesting to compare the impact
of different models of credit risk on the good deal bound interval. Jaschke and
Ku¨chler (2001) show that the lower good deal bound is a coherent risk measure.
From this point of view, it would be interesting to compare how sensitive the
lower good deal bound is to modeling choices in the context of counterparty
risk. Good deal hedging is another interesting direction to extend current work
on good deal bounds.
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